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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

S'TATE OF UTAH

BERNICE ULIBARRI,

Plaitntiff and Appellamt,
vs.
JOSEPH CHRISTENSON and SALT
LAKE CAB OWNER'S OPERATING CO., INC., doing business a.s
UTE CAB C·O.,

Case No.

8191

Defendants and Respond-ents.

BRIEF· OF

RI~SPONDENTS

STATEMENrr OF F·ACTS
This appeal arose out of an order granting a motion
for Summary Judgment in favor of defendants below.
For this reason there are hut few facts appearing from
the record relating to the origin of the cause of action.
It would, therefore, seem desirable to relate briefly some
of the underlying events which are the background of
the present ap·peal.
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On August 18, 1953, at about 12 :10 a.m. a west-bound
1948 Chevrolet sedan driven by Juan Santiago Mateo
collided head-on with an east-bound 1947 Buick sedanette
driven by Wilford Joseph Coca on Utah Highway 48
about one and one-half miles east of Copperton, Utah.
Both drivers were rendered unconscious and the force of
the collision demolished both cars. Ap·proximately 10
minutes later and before investigators reached the scene
and while the darkened wrecked cars still remained on
the highway, respondent's 1953 Chevrolet taxicab, proceeding east, driven by John W. Christenson, rounded
a curve and, although the driver swerved as soon as his
lights revealed the wrecked cars, he was una:ble to avoid
a collision and glanced off the side of the stopp·e'd Buick
in which Mr. Coca was sitting, unconscious and seriously
injured as a re'Sult of the first collision. Mr. Coca died
three hours later in the hospital.
On August 22, 1953, ap·pellant, her son, her daughter,
and her husband executed a "Release of all Claims" (Ex.
1). On August 24, 1953, the check of respondent, Salt
Lake Cab Owner':s Operating Co., Inc., in the amount of
$300.00, as agreed upon in the release, was delivered to
ap·pella~t (R. 5). The check was later returned to
respondents.
Ap~p.ellant

brought suit on January 9, 1954, for the
alleged wrongful death of Mr. Coca. On February 26,
1954, respondents filed their Motion for Summary J udgment Sponsored
upon
the ground that the cause of action alleged
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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had been fully released and settled. This Motion was
argued on March 18, 1954, before the Law and Motion
Division of the District Court for Salt Lake County,
Judge Ray Van Cott, Jr., presiding, and granted; and
on March 23, 1954, judgment was entered. Thi'S appeal
followed.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTIO:N FO·R SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

ARGUMENT
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTIO:N FO·R SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

Appellant contends that the court erred in not finding as a matter of law that the_ R·elease was "null and
ineffective." The grounds of this contention are:
1. The Release is ambiguous and uncertain in that
it refers to "permanent and progressive" injuries whereas in actuality Mr. Coca was dead at the time the release
was executed.
2. There was a failure of consideration since $300.00
i.tn cash was not paid to plaintiff.
The con1plete answer to the first contention is found
1n an examination of the Release itself, attached as
appendix (Exhibit 1). It is in clear and precise terms
just what it purport~s to be-a "Release .of all Claims."
How it could be 1nade ambiguous by reference to "permanent and progressive" injuries when all interested perSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sons lmew that Mr. Coca had died is not explained by
appellant. And, in. fact, the Release itself makes this
reference: the "accident involved Wilford Joseph Coca,
who died from injuries sustained." (Exhibit 1).
That this argwnent · is completely frivolous and
palpably without merit is demon-strated by the fact that
at no time has appellant ever contended that she misunderstood the import or effect of the document she
signe·d.
Ap·pellant's second contention rests upon the
patently erroneous assumption that the Release calls
for payment in cash. Appellant might argue with equal
validity that it calls for payment in red gold.
Appellant concedes· that a promise will support a
Rele·ase (Brief, p. 5) 'but contends that here she was
entitled to cash. Even if she were, how can she complain
when the check was never p-resented for payment1 Particularly when defendants have at all times stood ready
to p·ay the amount agreed upon in the release.

In Dovich v. Chief Consolidated Mining Co·mpafii!J,
53 Utah 522, 174 P. 627,. (1918), this instruction was
approved by this Court:
"The defendant contends that if the plaintiff
ever had a clailn against the defendant, that the
same was fully settled between the parties by the
agreement and release introduced in evidence and
marked Exhibit 3. ·You are instructed that the
giving or receiving of tlie one dollar mentioned
was
not
essential
to make
a Services
binding
Sponsored by the S.J.
Quinney Law
Library. Funding for digitization
provided by thethe
Institute of same
Museum and Library
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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agreement, but that the agreement on the part of
the defendant co1npany to pay the plaintiff half
his wages for a period of 26 weeks was sufficient
consideration to Inake the same binding upon the
plaintiff. * * * "
~~The release recited receipt of one dollar. There was evidence that plaintiff rejected the tender of one dollar.)
The Dovieh Case fully recognizes that any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract will support
a release. The CB)Se of Shaw v. Victo,ria Coach LVnes, 314
Mass·. 262, 50 N.E. (2d) 27, cited by appellant is in no
way inconsistent with this principle, since, in the Shaw
Case, both the release and the draft were held to be
releases.
To argue that there was no consideration for thi'S
release is to grasp at straws, to ignore th·e substance of
the transaction, and to disregard the conduct of .hmnan
beings in their ordinary affairs.
It is asserted that the release should be set up as an
affirmative defense and should not be made the basis
of a motion for sununary judginent-that there is no
authority for such procedure.
Ifowever, Rule 56 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
"A party against whom a clai1n ... is asserted
... may, at any tim,e, move with or without supporting affidavits for a suntmary judgment in his
favor ... " (Emphasis added).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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And in Suckow Borax Mim.es Consolidate.d v. Borax Co~
solidated, (9 Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 196, defendant did
move for sunnnary judgment prior to answer with affidavits setting up a general release. The· Court said:
"Clearly Rule 56 permits affirmative defenses
to be raised in a motion for summary judgment.
(Citing Cases) And the amendment to Rule 12
('b) ... requires motion to dismiss (for failure
to state a claim) to be treated as a motion for
summary judgment if 1natters outside the pleadings. are presented to, and are not excluded by, the
court. * * * We accordingly hold that the affirmative defenses of release and statute of limitations
were properly raised and presente-d by the procedure employed by appelle~s." (p. 205).

a

In her brief, appellent complains that a copy of the
release was not attache.d to the affidavit.
It should be sufficient to point out that appellant
received ·a copy of the relea!Se prior to the hearing on
the motion (R. 17); the substance of the release was set
forth in the affidavit served with the motion (R. 2, 3);
appellant made no objection to the offer of the release
as an exhibit for p~urposes of the motion (R. 9') and made
no objection to any procedural matters until the motion
had been fully argued by both sides (R. 17.)
Under Rule 56, supra, the court may con'Sider
"admissions" of the parties. Appellant admitted in her
reply that she executed the#'elease. How app·ellant could
have been prejudiced in any way is not even suggested.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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'l'his argument is simply another diversion, far distant
from the issue in the case, designed to obscure rather
than illwninate.
The remainder of appellant's brief is devoted to the
argument that the material set forth in her reply was
sufficient to raise a genuine issue as to a material fact.
In this connection it might be of assistance· to the court
to set forth· a brief sun1mary of the law ·as it relates to
the sufficiency of affidavits on rnotion for sunrmary judgment.
Affidavits must be "made on personal knowledge"
and must "set forth srich facts as would be admissible
in evidence" and rnust ''show affirmatively that the.
affiant is competent to testify to the matters 'Stated
therein." Rule 56 (e) supra.
"Affidavits filed by a party in support of or
in opposition to a motion for summary judgrnent
must present evidence. The affidavits should
follow 'substantially the 'Same form as though the
affiant were giving testimony in court.'" Steward
e't al., v. Nissen et al., (D.C., D. Dela., 1942) 2
F.R.D. 545, quoting, Shientag, Sum1nary J udgment, 4 F'ordharn La.w Review 186,198.
Paragraph one of appellant's reply (R.. 5). states
simply that the release is· invalid. This is a stark conclu·sion which cannot be considered in determining whether
or not there is a genuine issue of fact.·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Paragraph 2 of appellant's reply states that the
release is without conside.ration. This statement is likewise an inadmissible conclusion. She states also that the
check was returned without having been presented for
payment. This is admitted by all parties. No issue of
fact is thereby generated.
Paragraph 3 of appellant's reply states that the
release is invalid because of great emotional distress and
mental and nervous shock and extreme mental pain suffered by plain tiff. This, also, is a conclusion, and,
even if this condition were shown by competent factual
evidence, it would not constitute a defense.
"In ordinary contracts the test is, were the
mental faculties so deficient or impaired ·that
there was not sufficient power to comprehend the
subject of the contract, its nature and its probable consequences, and to act with discretion .in
relation thereto, or with relation to the ordinary
affairs of life~" Hatch v. Hatch, et al., 46 Utah
218, 148 P. 433 (1914), Citing Tee Garden v.
Lewis, administrator, 145 Ind. 98, 44 N.E. 9. See,
also O'Reilly v. McClean, et al., 84 Utah 551, 37
P. (2d) 770 (1934); Burgess, et al v. Colby, et al,
93 Utah 103, 71 P. (2d) 185 (1937); and Jimenez
v. O'Brien, et al, (Utah 1949) 213.P. (2d) 337.
A p-e-rson may be in great emotional distress and
mental and nervous shock and extreme mental pain and
still "comprehend the subject of the contract, its nature
and probable consequences."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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It is most significant that appellant never has and
does not now contend or even suggest that she did not
know the nature and effect of the agreement.
In Jim.enez v. O'Brien, et al., (Utah 1949) 213 P.
(2d) 337, Plaintiff sued defendant for damages resulting
from an automobile accident occurring on July 6, 1945.
Jimenez was taken to the St. Marks Hospital where his
injuries were diagnosed as severe brain. contusion. He
was unconscious for two and one-half weeks. His condition, however, gradually improved after the eighth day
in the hosiptal. An insurance adjuster for the insurer
of the automobile which collided with that in which plaintiff was riding as a passenger, called on J'imenez on July
13, but Jimenez's condition rendered him incapa:ble of
carrying on a conversation. The adjuster returned to the
hospital in about a week at which time he was able to
talk with Jimenez, but Jimenez was unable to recall the
facts of the accident. Repeated visits were made to see
Jimenez, six or seven times in all. On August 13, 1945,
the adjuster took with him a shorthand reporter to the
hospital where she took down a series of questions asked
by the adjuster and answered by Jimenez. Jimenez testified at the trial that he had no recollection of this conversation. The adjuster testified that he returned to the
hospital the evening of that same day and discussed settlement with J'imenez. The next morning someone phoned
the adjuster from the hospital and requested that he· come
there. When he arrived, he found Jimenez fully dressed,
sitting on the bed talking with a woman friend. Jimenez
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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was given three drafts covering his hospital bills and
general damages of $1,000.00, and Jimenez signed a
general release. The drafts were endorsed and· aashed
with1n a short time. On each draft above the. endorsement
there was stated that the endorsement constituted a
release of all claims.
On Septe1nber 5, Jimenez called up the adjuster's
office and requested payment of a bill at the General
Hospital of $26.35. A draft was thereupon issued for
that amount. After Jimenez had left with the draft, the
adjuster realized that he had neglected to have Jimenez
.sign a release for this draft; he caught up with him before he had left the office building. J'imenez returend
to the office and signed a similar release.
Several months later Jimenez consulted an attorney,
and action was commenced. Defendant pleaded the release,. and plaintiff replied, alleging that he was not
mentally competent to contract at the time he signed the
release. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff.
The Supreme Court held that the jury could not have
reasonably found ·by clear, unequivocal, and· convincing
evidence that Jimenez was mentally incompetent to contract on both August 14, 1945, and on September 5, 1945,
saying that clear unequivocal, and convincing evidence
is a higher degree of p·roof than a mere preponderance
of the evidence and app·roa~hes tha.t degree of proof beyond Sponsored
reasonable
doubt. The Court relied upon the test
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
laid down in Hatch v. Hatch, sup.ra, and found that
Jimenez could 1neet the test of contractural capacity as
a matter of law. The judg1nent was reversed.
There is no fact contained in Paragraph 3 of the
reply which would, if true, be sufficient to, avoid the
release; nor was any such fact represented to the Court
by appellant's attorneys at the time of the argument, even
though Judge Van Cott specifically requested on several
occasions for appellant to state what her evidence would
show. Every opportunity was afforded appellant to represent to the court any fact which would relieve appellant
from the release. No such representa~ion was made.
Nothing was said which would even vaguely imply that
appellant did not know that she was releasing all claims.
No suggestion to that effect is made in this court.
In paragraph 4 o.f appellant's reply it is stated that
the release is invalid because of fraud and misrepresen tation-a further conclusion not admissible in evidence.
It is stated that defendants represented that the damage
to the cars was slight and that the taxi driver was a good
driver, and was without fault, and not negligent. No
statement is made to the effect that the driver was not
a good driver and was with fault or was negligent. However, even if such were the case, it is well established
that a misrepresentation of law does not vitiate a release
unless it is made recklessly or without belief of its
truth, none of which appears from appellant's reply or
from stateinents rnade during the argument upon this
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
motion. Nor does it appear fro1n appellant's reply that
the damage to the Coca car caused ·by the cab was not
s~ght or that app·ellant signed the release under a misapprehension of that fact or that such a representation
was made for the purpose of deceiving appellant or that
app·ellant did not have the ab'ility or understanding to
ascertain that fact for herself, nor would it appear that
such a fact would be material in any event.

In Kelley v. Salt Lake· Trarnsportation. Co.,. et al.,
(Utah 1941) 116 P. (2d) 383, quoted in part only by
app·ellants, plaintiff was a passenger in one of defendant's cabs on February 10,.1940, when the driver applied
his brakes without warning, in ·order to avoid a collision,
so suddenly that plaintiff was thrown from the rear seat
against the hack of the front seat and into the bottom of
the cab. Defendant denied negligence, but to discharge
any possible claims on February 21, 1940, paid to plaintiff $20.00, which plaintiff acknowledged receipt of in
writing and in consideration thereof, released defendants from all claims. In her reply plaintiff admitted signing the release, but alleged that her signature was procured ·by misrep-resentation and fraud, consisting of
statements made by defendants' agents that defendants
were not l'iable to her in dam.ages. Later plaintiff returned the $20.00 to defendants, stating that she would
not further be bound by the p·rovisions of the release.
The evidence showed that on February 13', plaintiff called
Mr. Charlef;; A. Boynton of defendant company, and he
sent. her to see Dr. Spencer Wright. On the 14th Mr.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Boynton had Dr. Wright call at plaintiff's home. On the
15th or 16th plaintiff saw Dr. Byron Reese and on the
18th, Dr. Howard T. Anderson, both doctors of her
choice.. In response to a telephone call fron1 plaintiff,
Mr. Boynton saw her on the 14th or ~5th and offered
her $10.00 and payment of all doctor bills in settlement,
which she refused. In response to a telephone call by Mr.
George Utley, plaintiff's brother, Mr. Boynton returned
to plaintiff's home on the 21st. Mr. Utley had stated
that they were ready to talk settlement. Mr. Boynton
offered payment of $20.00 and payment of all past doctor
bills and further treatments by Dr. Wright. Mr. Utley
suggested plaintiff accept. Plaintiff signed the release
and received $20.00 in currency.
The Court said:
"A release may be avoided if the. releasor is
at the time of its execution mentally incompetent,
and this incompetence may be caused by various
things, such as disease or physical injury, nervous
shock, extreme mental pain, etc., or if the release
is obtained by fraud and misrepresentation. ·But
to so make a release void, it must be clearly shown
that the releasor did not possess at the time of
the execution of the release sufficient understanding to know the nature and effect of the agreement, or to be able to carefully consider his or
her rights, or that he or she signed the release
·under a misapprehension of the facts, which was
induced by the false and fraudulent representations of the party released, made for the purpose
of deceiving the releasor and actually deceiving
him or her as to the facts. It is the duty of a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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releasor, having the ability and understanding to
familiarize himself or herself with the contents
of the written release and to exercise prudence in
signing it.
"The evidence of fraud rnust be clear, precise,
and indubitable; otherwise it should be·withdrawn
from the jury.
"In the absence of a confidential relationship
... a misrepresentation of law does not vitiate a
release unless it is 1nade recklessly or without
belief of its truth.
"The inadequacy of the consideration for the
release may be so gross as to clearly indicate
fraud, hut ·here the consideration was not grossly
inadequate, and is not indicative of any fraud or
overreaching on the part of the appellant companies' agent."

It was held that the Trial Court erred in failing to direct
a verdict in favor of the defendant.
Paragraph 5 states that defendants possessed
superior knowledge of the facts and of the law and took
advantage of app·ellant's ignorance. This statement is so
obviously a conclusion that it could not be admissible in
evidence and is so vague as to present no fact at all for
the consideration and assistance of the court.
Appellant contends that the consideration for the
release was inadequate and was a badge of fraud. This,
of course, assumes defendants were liable and that plaintiff has suffered p·ecuniary damage, none of which is
supported by any evidence set forth in the reply or
otherwise.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In Dovich v. Chief Consolida.ted Mining Compam;y,
53 Utah 522, 174 P. 627 (1918), this Court ap·pToved the
following language contained in an instruction:
"If you find from the evidence that the plaintiff signed the release understanding that he was
giving up his cause of action against the defendant, your verdict must be in favor of the defendant, and it is not material that you may believe
that the consideration agreed upon. was not adequate considering the extent of the injury as it
now appears. :J • • "
See also, .A.nders;on v. Oregon Shortline Railroad Company, 47 Utah 614, 155 P. 446 (1916) where $25.00 was
paid for injury resulting in amputation of a finger, and
Kelley v. Salt Lake Tra;n.sportation Co., et al, supra.
Under the Kelley and Jimenez cases a release can
be avoided only by "clear, unequivocal, and convincing
evidence"-evidence approaching that degree of proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Such evidence the ·appellant
failed to show.
CONCLUSION
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
Rule 56 of the F·ederal Rules of Civil Procedure were
adopted for definite and specific reasons. As the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently
observed:
"The purpose of the rule is to provide against
the vexation and delay which comes from the
formal trial of cases in which there is not su'bstantial issue of fact, and permit the expeditious
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
disposition of cases of that kind." Broderick Wood
Products Co. v. United States, (10 Cir. 1952) 195
F. (2d) 433.
App·ellant suggests that judg1nent was entered
against her in this case because o.f her failure to strictly
comply with the rules relating to the form of affidavits.
App:ellant forgets that she was given the opportunity of
going beyond the matters contained in her Reply. She
forgets that the court made repeated inquiry for any
information tending to indicate that a genuine issue of
fact might be in existence. Ap.pellant had no such facts
then and has none now. Appellant was ·satisfied with the
settlement when made but later simply changed her mind.
Releases and settlements perform ~ salutory funetion in the adjustment of claims and in the compromise
of difference.s. It is indeed fortunate that the law does
not permit a person to repudiate a settlement agreement
upon the. me&gre showing made by appellant in this case.
If such were the law, "settlements,. instead of becoming
the means of avoiding strife and unnecessary litigation,
would become a most prolific source of both." And.erson
v. Oregon Shortline Rail'road Comp·awy, 47 Utah 614, 618,
155 P. 446 (1916).
The judg1nent of the lower court rests firmly upon
sound and established legal principles-both substantive
and procedural. It should be affirmed by this Court.
Respectfully sub1nitted·,
SK~EN, THURMAN,

WORS-LEY & SNOW,
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Attorneys fQr Responi/;ent.

RELEASE OF ALL ClAIMS

I

~l)l

~~

gm IN COJ!SIDERJ-TIO~f the pa~~/us at this time of the sum oL----------;;;;;---

~

.~-~-.'--J.······-· . "L.a.r;.............................Dollars_ ($.3.-a.o~---->,

:::::.::~~~:J~:&y~L.::~

_::

of and from any and all action, causes o acti n, claims, demands, damages, costs, loss of services, expenses and compensation, on account of, or in any way growing out of, any and all known and unknown

that recovery therefrom is uncertain and indefinite, and in making this release and agreement it is
understood and agreed that ljwe rely wholly upon myjour own judgment, belief and knowledge of the
nature, extent and duration of said injuries, and that ljwe have not been influenced to any extent whatever in making this release by any representations or statements regarding said injuries, or regarding
any other matters, made by the persons, firms or corporations who are hereby released, or by any person or persons representing him or them, or by any physician or surgeon by him or them employed.
It is further understood and agreed that this settlement is the compromise of a doubtful and
t the

c

!r.

~h-

~~;o~ to~~~as an admission of ~a~i~ty.on the part of.~

.........,~--~~...-~ .....,by whom liability 1s expressly demed.

c tains the ENTIRE AGREEMENT between the parties hereto, and the terms of this
release are contractual and not a mere recital.
ljwe further state that I;we have carefully read the foregoing release and know the contents
thereof, and ljwe sign the same as myjour own free act.

Wltn~-----hand,and sealoothi•---~--10?-.='Y of-----4-2--------------------· 19..6::.3
In presence of

CAUTION! READ BEFORE SIGNING

~--~~~---------------(Seal)

"'-~~i.-.(Seal)
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./:£:.~~~~~-.;) _______________ (Seal)
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